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THE NEW YORK FAMILY COURT ACT
MONRAD G. PAULSEN*
I. THE IDEAL OF A FAiILY COURT
An assault by a husband upon a wife, an act of delinquency by a child,
the failure of a husband to support his family, the neglect of a baby by a
mother, may seem to be instances of quite different kinds of behavior. Yet a
common thread links them all-they are manifestations of the breakdown of
family ties. In most states, and before September, 1962, in New York, these
items of misbehavior would be dealt with by several different courts.' Assaults
are grist for a criminal court's mill. Neglect and delinquency cases are proper
to a juvenile court. Divorce, annulment and judicial separation matters are
referred to still a different court.
There are obvious advantages if one tribunal possesses the competence
to deal with all aspects of a single problem. An additional advantage lies in
the promise that such a court might employ approaches differing from those
commonly used by the ordinary courts. Proceedings involving children and
* Professor of Law. Columbia University.
1. The Temporary Commission on the courts in its Plan For a Simplified State-Wide
Court System (July 2. 1956) at p 91 described the fragmentation of the legal problems
of the family throughout the court system as follows:
At present, family problems in New York State may find their way to any one
of ten different courts:
1. Delinquent and neglected children are treated in Children's Court outside
New York City and in the Domestic Relations Court in New York City.
2. Adoptions are dealt with by the Surrogate's Court, the County Court, and
in some instances, the Children's and Domestic Relations Cou rts.
3. Matrimonial actions are handled by the Supreme Court.
4. Support matters when they arise out of matrimonial actions are under
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; otherwise they go to Children's or Domestic
Relations Courts, City Courts or Special Sessions Courts, the District Court of
Nassau County, or town and village Justice Courts.
5. Paternity, in so far as support of a child born out of wedlock is concerned.
is handled in the Court of Special Sessions in New York City and in the Children's
Courts outside the City. However, if a determination of parental status is involved.
an action for declaratory judgment must be brought in the Supreme Court. or in
certain instances, the matter may be determined in the Supreme Court incidental
to a matrimonial action.
6. Assaults and certain other crimes and offenses by one member of a family
against another find their way to the County Courts, Courts of Special Sessions and
the City Magistrates' Courts of the City of New York, City Courts outside of New
York City, the District Court of Nassau County and town and village Justice
Courts.
7. Jurisdiction over legal custody is in the Supreme Court while physical
custody is frequently determined in the Children's and Domestic Relations
Courts.
8. The Children's Courts in counties outside New York City have juris-
diction over aid to physically handicapped children. In New York City, these
matters are handled by an administrative agency, the Health Department.
9. Wayward minors between 16 and 21 years of age are dealt with by a
variety of courts upstate-Children's Courts. County Courts, City Courts and
any magistrate other than a Justice of the Peace; in New York City they are
dealt with in the City Magistrates' Courts in either Adolescent Term, Home
Term or in Girl's Term respondents.
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the family ought not be geared to the common adversary process but to
processes which are preventative and conserving in character having the
aims of maintaining family stability and of rescuing children from the usual
disadvantages of condemned misbehavior.
Socialized courts with these aims require a specialized judiciary composed
of men and women who understand the court's mission and who have gained
the advantage of specialized experience. In addition, these courts need the
assistance of professionals from the social and biological sciences. For example.
in children's cases (as well as in some other kinds), a family court ought to
have an intake service which would help the interested parties to arrive at an
adjustment not requiring court action if such an adjustment is possible. After
an adjudication of delinquency or neglect, a judge makes a wise disposition
only if he has a diagnostic and study staff (social, medical and psychological)
to recommend a plan of treatment. The treatment plan itself may require the
employment of skillful probation officers. Cases of non-support or family
violence can often be best treated by a staff skilled in making the most of
reconciliation possibilities. In adoption cases, a social report on the character
of the adoptive parents and casework with these parents prior to the formation
of new family ties are obviously desirable.
In short, the ideal of a Family Court envisions a court with full power
over the main aspects of family troubles-a court, staffed with trained auxiliary
services, not limited in its operation to the adversary system.2
II. THE BACKGROUND TO THE FAMILY COURT AcT
The 1961-1962 court reorganization in New York State derived in part
from studies and recommendations made by the Temporary Commission on
the Courts, the so-called Tweed Commission.3 At first the Commission em-
braced the view that controversies involving children and families should be
resolved in a single court but not in a separate Family Court.4 The creation
of a Family Court was thought to be inconsistent with the Tweed Commission's
basic purpose of integrating and unifying the entire court system. Family
controversies, it was proposed, should be handled by a specialized part of a
regular trial court. The court chosen should operate on the "highest level
practicable." In such a court, the most wide ranging judicial powers could
2. See Harrison, 9 New Pattern for Family Justice (Com. Serv. Soc. N.Y., 1954);
Sheridan, The Family Court, 4 Children 67 (1957); Goldberg and Sheridan. Family
Courts-An Urgent Need, 8 Journal of Public Law 337 (1959); Standard Family
Court Act, 5 NPPA J. 99 (1959).
3. The Commission was created by Ch. 591, N.Y. Sess. Laws of 1953 and con-
sisted of appointees of the Governor, the President pro tern of the Senate and the
Speaker of the Assembly. Those appointed were among the most distinguished
lawyers in the State of New York.
4. Rep., Temp. Comm. on the Courts (The Plan for a Simplified State-wide
Court System) 88-90 (July 2 1956).
5. Rep., Temp. Comm. on the Courts (The Plan for a Simplified State-wide
Court System) 88 (July 2, 1956).
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be focused upon problems of family law. The courts of the highest level would
attract and keep first rate personnel. Further, a separate domestic relations
and children's court "tends to become isolated from the main judicial stream."
The Commission argued that a separate court would command less respect
than a high ranking trial court and further that in a family tribunal, often,
"the social work function becomes controlling, to the detriment of the judicial
function." 7 Perhaps the most important reason for rejecting a proposal for
a family court was a practical one. It was highly unlikely that "a separate
Family Court would ever be given plenary jurisdiction over all family matters."8
This initial proposal of the Tweed Commission would have lodged all
family matters, including non-contested matrimonial actions (divorce, annul-
ment, separation and dissolution proceedings), in a special Family Part of
the Supreme Court in New York City and in the County Court outside New
York City. The County Court was chosen because in many of the smaller
counties, the Supreme Court is geographically far removed from families in
trouble, and in some counties a term of the Supreme Court is held only once
every two or three months. The County Court, while not exercising the plenary
power of the Supreme Court, is, of course, a court of generally wide jurisdic-
tion. Undefended matrimonial actions were to be disposed of in the Family
Part of the Supreme Court or of the County Court. Contested matrimonial
matters would be transferred to a trial part of the Supreme Court.9
A 1958 report of the Temporary Commission reported a change of position
in response to vigorous criticism.' 0 The new recommendation urged the
creation of a separate Family Court in New York City and the setting up of
a Family Division of the County Court in upstate New York with the proviso
that in counties having three or more county judges, one judge be designated
as the Family Division Judge. Under the 1958 proposal, the' Supreme Court
would retain jurisdiction over all aspects of matrimonial actions and habeas
corpus proceedings involving the custody of children except that the Supreme
Court would be given the right to refer to the family tribunal habeas corpus
proceedings and any phase of matrimonial actions except the actual trial of
the issue of status.
After the Tweed Commission was abolished and the Legislature failed
to enact its recommendations, the task of suggesting reorganization of the
court structure was referred to the Judicial Conference by the Governor.
In its report of November, 1958, the Judicial Conference recommended the
establishment of a state-wide Family Court. This court, to be a court of record,
6. Rep., Temp. Comm. on the Courts (The Plan for a Simplified State-wide
Court System) 89 (July 2, 1956).
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Rep., Temp. Comm. on the Courts (The Plan for a Simplified State-wide
Court System) 99 (July 2, 1956).
10. Rep., Temp. Comm. on the Courts (Recommendations for the Reorganization
of the Structure of the Courts of the State of New York and their Administration)
Legis. Doc. No. 36, 18-20 (1958).
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was ultimately established by amendments to the State Constitution and ensuing
legislative enactments.
The state-wide Family Court was to be given power over the following
kinds of cases:
(1) The protection, treatment, correction and commitment of
children who are in need of the exercise of the authority of the court
because of circumstances of neglect;
(2) The custody of minors except for custody incidental to
actions and proceedings for marital separation, divorce, annulment of
marriage and dissolution of marriage and except for custody in habeas
corpus proceedings;
(3) The adoption of all persons;
(4) The support of dependents except for support incidental to
actions and proceedings in this State for marital separation, divorce,
annulment of marriage or dissolution of marriage;
(5) The establishment of paternity;
(6) Proceedings for conciliation of spouses;
(7) As may be provided by law, the guardianship of all persons;
and
(8) Crimes and offenses, except felonies, by or against children
or between spouses or between parent and child or between members
of the same family or household.
The Family Court would also have jurisdiction to determine, with the
same powers possessed by the Supreme Court, the following matters when
referred to the Faifly Court from the Supreme Court:
(1) Habeas corpus proceedings for the determination of the
custody of minors; and
(2) In actions and proceedings for marital separation, divorce,
annulment of marriage and dissolution of marriage, applications to fix
temporary or permanent support and custody, or applications to en-
force judgments and orders of support and of custody, or applications
to modify judgments and orders of support and of custody which may
be granted only upon the showing to the Family Court that there has
been a subsequent change of circumstances and that modification is
required."
The power to grant divorce, annulments, marital separations and dissolutions
of marriage was to remain in the Supreme Court.
The Tweed Commission had recognized that the failure to place matri-
monial actions within the jurisdiction of a Family Court was a compromise
with an ideal conception. The Commission, nevertheless, hailed its 1958 modi-
fied plan as a "long step in the development of a unified Family Court." "The
power of reference," said the 1958 report, "given to the Supreme Court will
. . . necessarily bring auxiliary services to assist the court in those family
-matters where such services are most needed.' 2 During the first months of
11. 4th Ann. Rep., Judicial Conference-of the State of New York (Recommendations
for Modernization of the Court Structure in the State of New York) 89-90 (1958).
12. Rep., Temp. Comm. on the Courts (Recommendations for the Reorganizations
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the new Act's operation, the optimism of the Commission has been only par-
tially justified. While some upstate Supreme Court Justices have made re-
ferences to the Family Court, those sitting in New York City have not done so.
The court, then, as it emerged, is concerned with existing families and not
with changes of family status. It may assist the Supreme Court in custody' 3
and support 14 matters incident to matrimonial actions and thereby bring to
that court the aid of the Family Courts Auxiliary Services.
III. CouRT ADmINISTRATION
According to Section 113 of the Family Court Act, the Court is established
"in each county of the state as part of the unified court system for the state."
The unified court system places administrative responsibility in the Ad-
ministrative Board of the Judicial Conference. 15 The Board consists of the
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and the Presiding Justices of the four
Appellate Divisions. The Board has power to set standards for personnel
practices, to supervise the fiscal matters of the judicial system, to regulate the
dispatch of judicial business and to transfer judges and cases between the
courts of the court system. Such rule-making power as the Legislature permits
is lodged in the Administrative Board. The Board is also responsible for the
purchase and allocation of equipment and supplies for the courts, the prepara-
tion of budget estimates and the disposition of complaints and criticisms made
with regard to the administration of justice in the state.
The legislation provides for the appointment of a State Administrator
who is the Administrative Board's full-time professional assistant.
Supervision of the operation and administration of the courts in each
judicial district is the responsibility of the Appellate Divisions. The Appellate
Divisions may designate one or more of the judges as an administrative judge
or judges to aid in the task of administration.
In the City of New York, this latter provision caused a great deal of
controversy. The First and Second Judicial Departments each include part
of the City of New York. If administration were to proceed along the lines
of judicial departments, the Family Court would be subject to divided au-
thority. The Act, however, provides that the First and Second Judicial De-
partments may jointly supervise the Family Court should the Appellate
Divisions decide that such supervision will facilitate the accomplishment of the
purposes of the court system. If the Appellate Divisions do not decide upon
joint supervision, the Administrative Board may direct it.
The Act further provides that an administrative judge for the Family
of the Structure of the Courts of the State of New York and their Administration)
Legis. Doc. No. 36, 19 (1958).
13. N.Y. Family Ct..Act § 652.
14. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 461-469.
15. The statutory provisions about court administration are found in article
7-A of the Judiciary Law, Sections 210-230.
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Court within the City of New York shall be designated, upon the joint nomina-
tion of the Presiding Justices of the First and Second Department, by a major-
ity of the justices of each of the Appellate Divisions involved. If the Appellate
Divisions are unable to agree, the designation may be made by the Administra-
tive Board. In fact, a joint administration has been ordered in New York City
under the leadership of an administrative judge, Judge Florence Kelley.
In the City of New York the Family Court is to consist of 23 judges
appointed by the mayor for a term of 10 years.' 6 The only qualification for
appointment is that the candidate be admitted to practice law in the state
for 10 years. The mayor, is, however, exhorted to appoint those who are es-
pecially qualified for Family Court work by reason of their character, per-
sonality, tact, patience, and common sense.'
7
In counties outside the City of New York, the judges of the County
Court act as and discharge the duties of the judge of the Family Count except
that in certain of the larger counties, where special Children's Court judges
had been sitting under the prior law, an equivalent number of Family Court
judges was authorized by statute.'8 Outside the City, the judges are elected
for a term of 10 years.19
The Family Court is provided with a probation service in each county. 0
The court further has the power to cause persons within its jurisdiction and
the parents of children who come before it to be examined by a physician, a
psychiatrist or a psychologist, where such an examination would be usefuL'
In addition, the court may be provided with such other auxiliary services as
may serve the purposes of the act.m
IV. TE JURIsDICTION oF Trnu FAMIy CouRT
A. Neglect Cases
The Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings
involving an allegedly neglected child.
A neglected child is defined as a male less than sixteen and a female less
than eighteen:
(h) whose parent or other person legally responsible for his care
does not adequately supply the child with food, clothing, shelter, edu-
cation, or medical or surgical care, though -financially able or offered
financial means to do so; or
(b) who suffers or is likely to suffer serious harm from the im-
proper guardianship, including lack of moral supervision or guidance,
16. N.Y. Family CL Act §§ 121, 123.
17. N.Y. Family CL Act § 124.
18. N.Y. Family CL Act §§ 131, 132.
19. N.Y. Family CL Act § 135.
20. N.Y. Family CL Act § 252.
21. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 251.
22. N.Y. Family CL Act § 253.
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of his parents or other person legally responsible for his care and re-
quires the aid of the court; or
(c) who has been abandoned or deserted by his parents or other,
person legally responsible for his care.
23
The statute provides for state intervention should a child's custodian
fail to provide the level of physical care suggested by the term "adequate"
and the level of guardianship and moral care which would protect a child from
"serious harm."
While subsections (a) and (c) direct the court's attention to the repre-
hensible conduct of the respondent parents, (b) can be read to permit an
adjudication of neglect without reference to parental fault. The operative issues
are the fact of improper guardianship and the serious harm which a child
suffers or is likely to suffer. The failure to employ the restraints normal to
ordinary child care would seem to be a ground for adjudication as well as
immoral teaching and bad example. Perhaps mere failure to provide love and
affection is a ground under (b) even though the parents lack affective capacity
It can be safely predicted that many judges will employ this paragraph to
adjudicate runaway children as neglected rather than as persons in need of
supervision.
2 4
For purposes of neglect proceedings, the age of the respondent at the
time the proceedings are initiated is controlling25
B. Support Cases
The new Court has original, exclusive jurisdiction over support proceed-
ings brought pursuant to the Family Court Act and of proceedings brought
under the Uniform Support of Dependents Law.2 6 Proceedings may be inaugu-
rated by a wife, child or relative in need of support. In addition, public welfare
officials may begin a support proceeding if the person to be supported is a
welfare client.
27
The court not only has the power to enter support orders but in addition
may issue orders of protection ancillary to orders made under the law.p
Elaborate enforcement powers are granted to the court including the
power to imprison the respondent,29 to place him on probation,"0 to require
a written undertaking with a sufficient surety,3' to issue a writ seizing his
property should he flee (or threaten to do so).32
23. .Y. Family Ct. Act § 312.
24. See p. 430 infra.
25. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 314.
26. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 411.
27. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 422.
28. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 446.
29. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 454, 455.
30. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 454, 456.
31. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 454, 471.
32. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 454, 457.
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In support cases, the Court acts largely as a collection agency although
conciliation of the parties may be promoted by authorized intake conferences
with the probation service and by adjustment efforts at a time of default in
payments.
The support provisions of the Family Court Act contain some interesting
provisions of substantive law that make New York quite unusual among the
States of the Union. Under section 412 a husband's duty to support his wife
depends upon his means and ability to pay "a fair and reasonable sum, as the
court may determine, having due regard to the circumstances of the respective
parties." (Emphasis added.)
In most states the husband's duty would have been measured by the stand-
ard of living of the couple before separation, and his obligation would run to
supporting the wife without any regard for her means. Further, in most states
a wife could not get a support order unless she was separated from her husband
without fault
33
In addition to imposing upon parents the general duty to support their
children, the parents, grandparents, or children of those who receive public
welfare assistance must contribute a fair and reasonable sum to the welfare
recipient. In a like manner, step-parents are made responsible for the support
of minor children.34
The Family Court has certain functions in relation to support and custody
matters arising in the matrimonial actions which are reserved by law to the
Supreme Court. In the absence of an order of the Supreme Court, the Family
Court may entertain a petition for child support in spite of the fact that the
parents have been separated or divorced.35 The Family Court may enforce or
modify a support order of the Supreme Court unless that court has expressly
retained jurisdiction38 In actions for divorce, separation or annulment, the
Family Court, upon reference by the Supreme Court, may award temporary
or permanent support for a child or a wife.3 7 The Supreme Court may also refer
applications to fix temporary or permanent custody to the new tribunal.3 s
Upon reference from the Supreme Court, the Family Court may entertain
habeas corpus proceedings for the custody of minors 39
C. Paternity Proceedings
The Family Court has original exclusive jurisdiction in paternity pro-
ceedings, the principal purpose of which is to secure support money from the
putative father. These proceedings are no longer characterized as quasi-
33. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 50 N.V. 2d 336 (1953).
34. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 415.
35. N.Y. Family CL Act § 461(a).
36. N.Y. Family CL Act § 461(b).
37. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 461(c), 462-464.
38. N.Y. Family CL Act § 467.
39. N.Y. Family CL Act § 651.
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criminal but are seen as civil proceedings simply; accordingly much of the
criminal law terminology found in the prior law has been discarded.4 0
The filiation order now is made by a single Family Court judge although
in New York City, prior to the new law, paternity proceedings were heard
by a panel of three judges.
D. Permanent Termination of Parental Rights, Adoption and Guardianship
The Family Court Act has incorporated prior legislation designed to
permit the ending of the parent-child relationship in some cases. These termina-
tion proceedings are available if parents have been dramatically neglectful
of a child. The petition must allege that the child has been placed in an in-
stitution or foster home, that the child's interests require permanent termina-
tion, that diligent efforts have been made to encourage and strengthen the
parental relationship, and that the parents have failed "substantially and
continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with and plan for the future
of the child although physically and financially able to do so." 41
The Act does not contemplate voluntary termination proceedings of the
sort recommended by the Children's Bureau of the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare. The Children's Bureau urges that termina-
tion be adjudicated upon a petition voluntarily filed by a child's parents
provided the interests of the child would be served by the adjudication.42 A
statute with such a provision would make possible judicial determination that
parents fully understand the implications of termination and hence fewer
troublesome problems would be generated over the validity of a natural parent's
privately expressed consent to adoption. Further, judicial termination divests
parents of their rights, privileges and duties with a clarity that private relin-
quishment does not accomplish.
According to the original version of the new Act, after September 1, 1964,
the Family Court was given exclusive original jurisdiction over adoption
matters.43 Until that date the court's power is concurrent with that of the
Surrogate's Court. A 1963 amendment to the Act would have removed the
provision for exclusive Family Court jurisdiction, thus the present scheme
would have been retained indefinitely.44 Many factors moved the lawmakers but
certainly the Family Court's heavy load of work was important. The Family
Court also has jurisdiction, along with the County Court and the Surrogate's
Court, to appoint a guardian of the person.
45
40. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 511-563.
41. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 614.
42. Children's Bureau, Standards for Specialized Courts Dealing with Children
79-84 (1954); Children's Bureau, Legislative Guides for the Termination of Parental
Rights and Responsibilities and the Adoption of Children 9-13 (1961).
43. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 641.
44. Assembly Iitro. 3453, Assembly Print 3523. This bill was vetoed by the Governor
in late April, 1963.
45. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 661.
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E. Juvenile Delinquency and Persons in Need of Supervision
Article seven of the Family Court Act sets up proceedings designed to
determine whether certain misbehaving children should be subject to the
treatment processes of the court. In almost all states, children who commit
acts which are crimes if performed by adults and children who are beyond
the control of parents (i.e., are "incorrigible," "wayward," or "ungovernable")
are subject to the power of a juvenile court according to some scheme of
classification. Such children may be "juvenile delinquents," "wards of the
court" or "subject to the court's jurisdiction." The New York law, however,
distinguishes between "juvenile delinquent," i.e., "a person . . . who does any
act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime"46 and "persons in need
of supervision," i.e., a youngster "who is an habitual truant or who is in-
corrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful con-
trol of parent or other lawful authority."47 Curiously, a child who, in breaking
the law, commits an "offense"--not a "crime," does not seem to be within
the jurisdiction of the Family Court at all.
The draftsmen of the Family Court Act resisted substantial pressure from
a great many civic organizations interested in child welfare directed at raising
the juvenile delinquency age in New York from sixteen years to seventeen or
eighteen. The legislators countered by insisting upon a study to determine the
consequences of raising the minimum age. In part, they were fearful that a
rise in the age might bring more business before the Family Court than it
could handle. It is probable that they were also concerned about popular
acceptance of such a move given the fact that seventeen- and eighteen-year-old
youngsters perform some very destructive, harmful acts which are likely to
be attended by sensational publicity. Some also may have felt that to include
the older group would inevitably affect the whole operation of the Family
Court by the introduction of a more punitively-oriented point of view. The
joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization did agree to study the
matter in time for possible amendment of the law during the 1963 legislative
session.
48
In the case of some serious crimes, the upper age limit is lower than sixteen.
Youngsters over fifteen who have committed crimes punishable by death or
life imprisonment are not dealt with in Family Court unless a case involving
such a youth has been sent to the new court by a criminal court.49
In the case of persons in need of supervision, the upper age limit is sixteen
years for males and eighteen for females. The older age limit for girls recognizes
46. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712(a).
47. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712(b).
48. See N.Y. joint Legis. Committee on Court Reorganization, Rep. VII (Young
Offenders and Court Reorganization) (1963). Public hearings resulted in temporary
abandonment of the proposal of age extension in March 1963.
49. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 715.
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the need to exercise supervision over sixteen- and seventeen-year-old run-
aways.
50
The operative age is to be determined by the time at which an alleged
delinquent act was done or at which the need for supervision arose rather than
by the time the proceeding was instituted. If proceedings are begun to deter-
mine whether a person is in need of supervision after the respondent's eighteenth
birthday, the Family Court must dismiss the petition. If a delinquency proceed-




Assaults and examples of disorderly conduct between husbands and wives
or other members of a household have historically given rise to criminal charges
launched against the aggressor. Typically these acts are responses to family
tension. Ordinarily, the objective of a complaining witness, in the words of the
new act, "was not to secure a criminal conviction and punishment, but prac-
tical help."'5 2 The Family Court, with the aid of probation services, promises
to give this help. After a hearing establishing that one member of a family
has assaulted or been guilty of disorderly conduct toward another family
member, the Act authorizes the Family Court to enter orders of protection
and support and contemplates conciliation proceedings. The court may dismiss
the petition if it concludes that the court's aid is not required; suspend
judgment for not more than six months; place the respondent on probation
for not more than one year, or make an order of protection. 3
The court may, if it concludes that Family Court processes are inap-
propriate in a given case, transfer that case to the criminal court. Added
flexibility is provided by provisions permitting the court, on its own motion
to file neglect, paternity or support petitions.5 4 Family offense proceedings
cannot be used in cases involving outsiders who harm family members; nor
can they be used in cases of adult family members who have allegedly com-
mitted acts contributing to the delinquency of children. The Family Court is
given no criminal jurisdiction.
The provisions respecting an order of protection are surprising:
an order may require such person
(a) to stay away from the home, the other spouse or the child;
(b) to permit a parent to visit the child at stated periods;
(c) to abstain from offensive conduct against the child or against
the other parent or against any person to whom custody of the child
is awarded;
SO. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712(b).
51. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 714.
52. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 811.
53. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 841.
54. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 815. This number has been changed to 817 by Assembly
Intro. 5019 § 4.
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(d) to give proper attention to the care of the home;
(e) to refrain from acts of commission or omission that tend to make
the home not a proper place for the child. 5
There is, in terms, no power to order a respondent to refrain from offensive
conduct against a spouse who is not a parent. Another example of careless
draftsmanship is provided by the fact that family offense petitions may ask
for the use of the court's conciliation procedure, yet the court is not expressly
given the power to direct the filing of a conciliation proceeding petition or to
proceed with conciliation on the basis of the family offense petition.
Under the Act of 1962 the Family Court possessed original exclusive
jurisdiction over family offenses. A 1963 amendment would have made an im-
portant change. 56 Under it the district attorney might hold a disorderly conduct
or assault complaint in criminal court by certifying that the processes of Family
Court would be inappropriate provided he stated reasons for his opinion. The
district attorney's judgment might be reversed. A grand jury might recommend
to the criminal court judge transfer of the proceedings to the Family Court. Upon
recommendation or upon its own motion the court to which an indictment is
returned might transfer the matter to the Family Court.
G. Conciliation Proceedings
The new Act seeks to promote family stability by setting up an informal
conciliation procedure for those "whose marriage is in trouble.157 The aims
of this part of the law are simply to promote a conciliation conference under
Family Court auspices and to encourage the parties to consult with appropriate
voluntary social or religious agencies. 58
The probation service is authorized to confer with the petitioner and the
petitioner's spouse with a view toward conciliation. Should these voluntary
sessions fail, the Family Court may order a petitioner's spouse to attend con-
ciliation conferences if it finds that the purpose of conciliation will be served
by the order. Both the probation services and the court are authorized to refer
the spouses to voluntary agencies. It should be understood that the conciliation
proceeding cannot affect marital status or relieve either party of a marital
obligation.
The worth of state-sponsored conciliation proceedings will depend upon
the expertness of the probation service. Compulsory conciliation is not a
promising means to re-establish the subtle ties of affection between husband
and wife. Yet these proceedings may have a great value as a beginning step
toward reuniting a family if the element of compulsion is muted. Typically,
marital difficulties are intensified by a breakdown in human communication.
55. N.Y. Family CL Act § 842.
56. Assembly Intro. 5019, Assembly Print 5651. This has been vetoed by the Governor.
57. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 911.
58. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 911-926.
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The hope in a conciliation proceeding lies in its ability to repair that break-
down either by conferences under court auspices or by a reference to another
agency which can help.
V. THE PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FAM1ILY COURT ACT
A. Emphasis on Procedural Rights
(a) Two hearing stages
In many respects, the Family Court Act reflects a concern for the pro-
cedural rights of those who appear before the Family Court."9 As a most
important example, the new Act, in dealing with family offense proceedings,
termination of parental rights controversies, juvenile delinquency cases and
neglect matters, carefully distinguishes between "adjudicatory hearings" and
"dispositional hearings." For example, in neglect proceedings an adjudicatory
hearing is defined as a hearing "to determine whether the allegations of a
petition ... are supported by a preponderance of the evidence." "Dispositional
hearings" on the other hand, are held "to determine what order of disposition
should be made." 60 In respect to the other proceedings, similar definitions are
found.
The express provision for two hearing stages reflects a concern of the
draftsmen that the exercise of a court's power should not turn upon a judge's
estimate of a "need" for treatment but should depend upon whether a particular
act or circumstance, selected by the Legislature as sufficient reason for judicial
action, has been established. The legislative design is one which bars, in the
adjudicatory hearing, reference to the respondent's prior record, his school
report, a social investigation, as well as general evidence of character and which
reserves such matters for consideration at the dispositional hearing. In part
this purpose is achieved, as we have seen, by differentiating between the issues
to be decided at each hearing; in part, by making different provisions regarding
the evidence which may be received.
In an adjudicatory hearing, only competent, material and relevant evidence
may be admitted. A dispositional hearing may consider all evidence provided
it is material and relevant.61 The Legislature probably wished to make clear
that the hearsay rule and some aspects of the opinion evidence rule were
not applicable to dispositional hearings. However, the drafting is unfortunate.
The testimony of exceedingly young children or insane persons are excluded
by rules of competency, yet surely such material should not be employed for
any purpose. Similarly testimony subject to the various privileges is ordinarily
labelled incompetent testimony. These privileges must be recognized in the
59. "The Proposed Family Court Act expresses a legislative determination to provide
a due process of law." N.Y. Joint Legis. Committee on Court Reorganization, Rep. II
(The Family Court Act) 9 (1962).
60. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 344-349. The adjudicatory hearing is now called a fact-
finding hearing. See Assembly Intro. 4742.
61. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 346.
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Family Court. However, a sensible exercise of judicial discretion could avoid
an extreme, literal application of statutory provisions.
(b) Law Guardians
Lawyers have never played an extensive role in children's or juvenile
courts. While attorneys have appeared with some frequency in neglect cases,
counsel have not often attended proceedings involving misbehaving children.
The poverty of most respondents is one factor which helps to explain the
lack of lawyer participation. Another influence has been genuine doubt about
the contribution which a law-trained person might make in a juvenile court,
given the ideal of a socialized court characterized by informal proceedings.
The opinion has been widely held that the facts empowering a court to act
are seldom in dispute while the truly significant questions are those surrounding
disposition. Attorneys may be useful in resolving factual disputes, the argu-
ment runs, but they can offer little aid in deciding dispositional issues.
In contrast to this history, the Family Court Act articulates a legislative
finding "that counsel is often indispensable to a practical realization of due
process of law and may be helpful in making reasoned determination of fact
and proper orders of disposition."62 To implement this finding the Act es-
tablishes a system of "law guardians" and emphasizes the right of respondents
to retain counsel. The costs of the law guardians are to be included in the
budgets of the Appellate Divisions.
In most of the proceedings for which provision is made in the Act, the
court by express provision of law has the duty to inform respondents of their
right to retain counsel. In neglect, juvenile delinquency and person in need of
supervision proceedings, the statute additionally requires that the court inform
respondents of their right to a law guardian provided at public expense if
the respondents are not able to obtain a lawyer "by reason of inability to
pay other counsel or other circumstances."6
3
The law guardians are attorneys admitted to practice law in the state
of New York, and they are designated by the Appellate Division of the ap-
propriate judicial department in three ways.64 First, the Appellate Division
may enter into an agreement with a legal aid society to provide law guardians
for the Family Court in a given county. Second, the Appellate Division may
designate a panel of law guardians for the Family Court in each county. It
may invite county bar associations to recommend qualified persons.
Third, under the terms of a 1963 Amendment, the Appellate Division may
enter into an agreement with any qualified attorney or attorneys to serve as
a law guardian for the family court in any county. This third way of providing
law guardians makes it possible for the counties which do not have a legal
62. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 241.
63. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 249.
64. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 243.
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-aid society to benefit, from specialized experience. Lawyers who appear in
family court infrequently are not likely to be as useful as those who under-
stand the court, its aims, procedures, and the workings of its staff.05
The law guardian system raises the question of the role which the attorney
should assume. The text of the Act suggests that the first duty of the law
guardian is to protect the minor for whom he has been appointed. For example,
a law guardian is defined as an "attorney . . . to represent minors."0 G In
another place, the statute speaks of the child's "right to be represented . . .
by a law guardian. '0 7 Yet such textual provisions do not solve the difficult
issues that are presented by the question, does a lawyer's task of representing
a child in Family Court differ from a lawyer's task in representing a client
before a criminal or civil court employing the familiar adversary system. The
proper resolution of the issue will be a long-time concern of the Family Court
judges, the law guardians and those legal aid societies who enter into law guard-
ian contracts.
The issue would have been intensified by a change in the law. Upon the
approval of the administrative board of the judicial conference, the family
court in a county might have appointed a lawyer to be the "family court repre-
sentative" who would represent the petitioner, "when, in the opinion of the
family court judge or judges, such representation will serve the purposes of
this Act." He might also have been assigned to perform other services. In
counties appointing family court representatives, the complete return to an
adversary system of proceeding would have been all but inevitable."8
(c) The Right to Remain Silent
In hearings to determine whether a youngster is a juvenile delinquent or
a person in need of supervision, the court has the duty to advise the respondent
of a right to remain silent. The value of recognizing the right to silence (an
analogy to the privilege against self-incrimination) has been hotly disputed on
the ground that the judge's statement to the respondent will introduce a
formal note, inconsistent with a helping and friendly courtroom atmosphere.
Some also have feared that the court would be unable to carry out its task
if every youngster were to exercise the right. A great many cases are heard
each day, and delays would be caused by the necessity to gather the proof
which a respondent's statements ordinarily supply. Whether those consequences
follow will depend upon the manner in which the right is explained and upon
the defense policies of the law guardians.
One final point about the right to silence: it must be explained "at the
65. Assembly Intro. 5017 § 14, Assembly Print 5649.
66. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 242. Section 241 of the Act speaks of the "right to the
assistance of counselrof their own choosing ..
67. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 741.
68. Assembly Intro. 3692, Assembly Print 3793. This has been vetoed by the Governor.
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commencement of any hearing."69 (Emphasis added.) Therefore the right
obtains in hearings which place children, commit them, determine probation
conditions and the like.
(d) Confidentiality of Reports
One procedural problem which gives rise to a painful dilemma is the
extent to which probation reports should be made available to parties affected
by them. While the reports may not be employed in adjudicatory hearings,
they frequently determine, as a matter of fact, the most important issue in a
case: shall a youngster be returned home or sent for a long period of time to
a disciplinary barracks? The dispositional judgment Will be based on reports
of a child's history, attitude, school record, relationships to his fellows, his
family, and the like. Obviously, the reports may be false, distorted or incom-
plete. The youth cannot correct an account unknown to him. If the report is
not made available to the child, only the professional discipline and personal
concern of the probation officer or other reporter are safeguards against errors
in documents.
On the other hand, social work agencies insist that they cannot operate
successfully if they do not protect their informants. They must ask for con-
fidential information and must respect the promise of confidentiality. Often,
too, a report will contain information from a parent, which, should a child
know of the parent's statement, might destroy the only hope for a youngster-
the strengthening of parental ties.
The Family Court Act has resolved the dilemma by calling the reports
"confidential information" but permitting the court, "in its discretion [to]
withhold from or disclose in whole or in part to the law guardian, counsel, party
in interest, or other appropriate person."
70
B. Legislative Direction of Disposition
Legislators who consider reshaping juvenlie court law are apt to find
themselves divided over the question of how much the Legislature should
control the disposition of youngsters brought before a court for children. Uni-
versally, some legislative limitations are found. Typically, a child adjudicated
"neglected" may not be committed to a disciplinary barracks designed for
delinquent children. The Family Court Act embraces this pattern but is more
detailed than the enactments in most states.
A neglected child may be placed only in an institution "suitable for the
placement of a neglected child."71 A "juvenile delinquent" may be committed
to the state training school or, in the case of boys who commit certain serious
69. N.Y. Family CL Act § 741.
70. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 746(b). This section of the Act refers to reports in de-
linquency proceedings. Simil provisions are found elsewhere.
71. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 355(a).
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offenses, to the Elmira Reception Center and, presumably, from there to a
reformatory. Persons in need of supervision, as a maximum disposition, may
be "placed" only in "an authorized agency, or a youth opportunity center." 7 2
The provision respecting persons in need of supervision (PINS) has created
pressing problems from the outset. Some youngsters, particularly girls in
total rebellion against parental authority, may require a kind of treatment
which contains a substantial measure of discipline. Private agencies are typically
unable or unwilling to receive placement of such children. Until new state
agencies specially adapted to their needs are created, these young people
cannot be effectively handled unless they can be sent to the existing disciplinary
institutions, now populated with adjudicated delinquents.
Some judges sent a few adjudicated PINS to state training schools. In
spite of the undoubtedly contrary views of the statute's sponsors, the judges
argued that such a school was an "authorized agency" within the meaning of
the law. For the moment the argument over the meaning of the Act has been
resolved. An amendment to the law provides that until July 1, 1964, the
term "authorized agency" includes the state training schools. The next session
of the Legislature will have to face the issue again.73
The law exhibits a determination on the part of the Legislature to control
disposition in other ways. Placements and commitments of children are limited
as to time. The maximum duration for a suspended judgment in the cases of
delinquents and persons in need of supervision is one year. Placement of
children in these groups may be made initially for only eighteen months with
the possiblity that the court after reviewing a report and recommendation from
the agency or person receiving the child may extend placement for additional
periods of one year. No extension may be made beyond a male's eighteenth
birthday or a female's twentieth without his or her consent. Probation for
delinquents may not be longer than two years; for persons in need of supervision
not longer than one year. An additional year is possible for each group in
"exceptional circumstances." The commitment of a delinquent may not exceed
three years. 74
Similar limitations apply to neglected children. The terms of suspended
judgment may not exceed one year; probation supervision may not exceed
one year; placements may not exceed eighteen months. Once again trovision
is made for court-granted extensions of treatment plans until a male's eighteenth
or a female's twentieth birthday.
75
Most persons trained in social work chafe at such restrictions. The limita-
tions run counter to the ideal that, once the power of the court over a child
is established, treatment should depend upon the need of the individual and
not upon the provisions of a statute geared, in part, to the circumstances
72. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 756(a).
73. Assembly Intro. 5170, Assembly Print 5968.
74. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 755, 756, 757, 758(c).
75. 'N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 353-355.
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which brought the respondent into court. Furthermore, social workers typically
object to placing the decision for extended treatment in the hands of judges
rather than the hands of professionally trained experts.
Thus far we have considered legislative control over commitment and the
duration of treatment plans. In addition, consistent with the Act's aim of solv-
ing as many issues as possible by express legislation, the statute spells out in
detail the kinds of disposition which the court may make. For example, after
an adjudication of delinquency, the Family Court judge may suspend judg-
ment, may continue the proceedings and make placement of the respondent,
may put the respondent on probation or in certain cases commit the respondent
to an institution. In the case of persons in need of supervision the judge may
discharge with a warning, suspend judgment, continue the proceedings and
place the respondent, or put the respondent on probation. 6 Similar choices are
articulated with respect to neglected children.
Two other important kinds of decisions may be made by the judge. In the
case of delinquency proceedings he may dismiss a petition on the ground that
the allegations of a petition have not been established. It is important to
understand that the petitions must allege not only an act if done by an adult
which would constitute a crime and the fact that the respondent was under
sixteen but also that the respondent requires supervision, treatment, or con-
finement.7 7 Therefore, a respondent who has done an act amounting to a
crime under circumstances which do not seem to call for the invocation of
the court's treatment facilities need not suffer whatever disadvantages may be
involved in an adjudication of delinquency. Secondly, a judge at any time and
on his own motion may substitute a petition to determine whether the
respondent is a person in need of supervision for a delinquent petition and he
may substitute a neglect petition for either a delinquency or a person in need
of supervision petition.
78
The legislators' desire to make certain that the judges do not act unless
the law clearly warrants action is reflected by a provision requiring the court
to state the grounds for making its findings79 of delinquency or that the
respondent is a person in need of supervision.
C. Limitation on Detention
The Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization was seriously
concerned over abuses in detention practices which the Committee found
to involve excessive and seemingly routine detentions.80 Most family and ju-
venile court laws do not provide in detail for the situations in which a young-
ster may be taken into custody. The Family Court Act of New York, however,
76. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 753-754.
77. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 731, 751.
78. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 716.
79. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 752.
go. N.Y. joint Legis. Committee on Court Reorganization, Rep. II (The Family
Court) 10-11 (1962).
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does contain provisions of this sort. A private person or a peace officer, accord-
ing to the Act, may take a person under the age of sixteen into custody without
a warrant only in cases in which a person may be arrested according to the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.8 ' The effect of this provision is
to forbid detaining any youngster without a warrant except one engaged in
crime or reasonably believed to have committed a serious crime. In contrast,
the Standard Family Court Act provides: "A child may be taken into custody
by any officer of the peace without the order of a judge . . . (c) when he is
seriously endangered by his surroundings, and immediate removal appears to
be necessary for his protection; (d) when there are reasonable grounds to
believe that he has run away from his parents, guardian, or legal custodian."82
Thus under the New York law, a truant or one who has done an anti-social
but non-criminal act (a person in need of supervision) cannot be taken into
custody without a court order. This consequence has been a source for concern
on the part of many active in the juvenile field because in many such cases
there is often a need for prompt action to hold a youngster in custody.
A 1963 amendment broadened the powers of police to handle a runaway.
Originally, the police were only given power to return the runaway to his
parents. Now the officer may bring the youth to a facility designated for the
reception of children. 3
In delinquency cases a peace officer who takes a youngster into detention
without a court order must immediately attempt to notify the child's parents.
Should he fail, the officer must bring the youth to the Family Court (not to
the police station) or to a shelter for children. Any facility receiving the custody
of a child has the duty to bring him to the Family Court as soon as possible.
84
Rules of court authorize release before a petition is filed under certain circum-
stances. When children are brought to court before a petition is filed, a judicial
hearing is to be held to decide whether the youngster can be released. In no
event may an alleged delinquent be detained for more than forty-eight hours
without a judicial hearing.85
An amendment to the law respecting detention is of first-rank importance.
Should a police officer determine "that it is necessary to question the child...
he may take the child to a facility designated by the appropriate appellate
division of the supreme court as a suitable place for the questioning of chil-
dren and there question him for a reasonable period of time. '1SG In determining
whether the questioning period is reasonable the amendment provides that a
child's age and the presence or absence of parents "shall be included among
the relevant considerations."
8i. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 721-722.
82. Standard Family Court Act § 16.
83. Assembly Intro. 5017 § 6, Assembly Print 5649.
84. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 724, 726.
85. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 728-729.
86. Assembly Intro. 5017, Assembly Print 5649 § 7.
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If one remembers that the law of criminal procedure nowhere makes an
express provision for police questioning, one can appreciate the startling impact
of this amendment. Under its protection police may question children freely
when officers have no such clearly stated permission to isolate serious adult
offenders for interrogation. Even the courts participate in the plan by designa-
tion of questioning places.
There are limitations upon the temporary removal of a neglected child
from his home. Only a peace officer may take a neglected child from his home
without a court order and then only if "his continuing in the home presents an
imminent danger to the child's life or health; and ... there is not time enough
to apply for . . . [a court] order .... ,,87 A court order directing temporary
removal of an allegedly neglected child before the filing of a neglect petition is
similarly limited to cases in which imminent danger to the child's life or health
appear and there is not sufficient time to file a neglect petition.88 Court orders
of temporary removal must specify the facility to which the child may be
brought. A peace officer effecting an emergency removal is required to bring
the child immediately to a place designated by rules of court as a suitable
place for detention of the neglected, and the officer is directed to inform the
parents or guardians as well as the probation service of the removal.
D. Intake
The Domestic Relations Court Act had no effective intake service to screen
those cases which, while technically falling within the court's power, involved
matters not serious enough for judicial attention. The new Act provides for a
preliminary procedure to be implemented by rules of court. For example, in
delinquency or person in need of supervision proceedings, rules of court may
authorize the probation service to confer with the petitioner, the respondent
and others regarding whether filing a petition is advisable and to attempt in-
formal adjustment in suitable cases before a petition is filed; conference and
adjustment is authorized only in respect to cases "over Which the court ap-
parently would have jurisdiction." 9 Similar preliminary conference and ad-
justment efforts are authorized for neglect, support, and family offense pro-
ceedings.
The powers of the probation service in carrying out this intake function
are, however, limited. The petitioner may insist upon filing a petition, and
the probation service may not prevent it.. Further, the adjustment may not
extend for a period of more than two months without permission of a judge
who may prolong the period for an additional sixty days. Finally, the proba-
tion service is given no power to compel the attendance of any person or the
production of any papers.
87. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 324.
88. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 322.
89. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 734.
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Fundamentally, the pattern is one which leaves to the petitioners the
decision whether to press forward to court adjudication. It is interesting to
note for comparison the fact that in criminal cases, private persons may not
force a prosecution. This decision is left to the prosecutor.
E. Religion
The Family Court Act contains many provisions designed to protect
and maintain the religious faith of the children who are subject to its orders
of disposition. First, when a child is placed on probation he must be given
a probation officer of his own religious faith provided that such an officer is
available.' In making orders protecting children from their parents or custodians
the court is charged "to insure that in the care, protection, discipline and
guardianship of the child his religious faith shall be preserved and protected.""'
A child, who is committed to an agency or institution or who is placed
with a person other than his parents, must be committed or placed, whcn
practicable, in a setting of his religious faith or persuasion. Likewise the
appointment of guardians and the granting of orders of adoption must be
governed, when practicable, by religious criteria. A section of the law emphasizes
the legislative policy by asserting that these provisions of law, "shall be inter-
preted literally, so as to assure that in the care, protection, guardianship,
discipline or control of any child his religious faith shall be preserved and
protected by the court." Further, the words "when practicable" are not to be
given effect by the court if "there is a proper . . . person of the same religious
faith or persuasion as that of the child available" as guardian, custodian or
adoptive parent. Similarly "when practicable" has no effect, in the case of
institutional commitment or placement if there is available to receive the
child an institution under the control of persons of the same religion as that
of the child. Finally, the law requires that judges, who make commitments,
placements or adoption orders across religious lines, "shall state or recite
the facts which impel it to make such disposition."
92
The "religious factor" provisions go much further in making religion an
overriding consideration in placement and commitment decisions than did the
pre-existing law. The exhortation to construe the statute literally is quite new.
The provisions which take the phrase "when practicable" out of the statute's
operation when a person or agency of the child's faith is available are seen
here for the first time. Indeed, in a 1958 case the Court of Appeals in an
adoption matter, speaking through Judge Fuld, bad said of this phrase, that
it did not contain an, "absolute requirement that the faith of the foster parents
be that of the child. The statute calls upon the court to give custody to persons
of the same religious faith as that of the child 'when practicable.' That term
90. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 252(c).
91. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 446, 759.
92. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116.
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is of broad content, necessarily designed to accord the trial judge a discretion
to approve as adoptive parents persons of a faith different from the child's in
exceptional situations."9' 3 Under the new law, the discretion remaining has been
severely circumscribed.
CONCLUSION
No family court act has received the legislative attention that New York
has given its law. Despite the failure to include matrimonial actions, the
statute is broad in scope. In fact, the absence of litigation respecting the
dissolution of families may be an advantage in that the new court now gives its
principal attention to the tasks of saving youngsters and reuniting the separated.
The Act exhibits a great concern for procedural fairness and for the pre-
vention of detention abuses. On the whole, it represents a brave attempt to
fit the socialized aims of a family court into a traditional procedural system.
What is to be learned is whether the application of scientific and clinical skills
is unduly hampered by a matrix of legislative controls.
93. In re Maxwell's Adoption, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 434, 151 N.E.2d 848, 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d
281, 284 (1958).
